الفراشة أصبح فتيات Ftayat.com : يتم تحديث الموقع الآن ولذلك تم غلق النشر والمشاركات لحين الانتهاء من اتمام التحديث
ترقبوا التحديث الجديد مزايا عديدة وخيارات تفاعلية سهلة وسريعه.
فتيات اكبر موقع وتطبيق نسائي في الخليج والوطن العربي يغطي كافة المجالات و المواضيع النسائية مثل الازياء وصفات الطبخ و الديكور و انظمة الحمية و الدايت و المكياج و العناية بالشعر والبشرة وكل ما يتعلق بصحة المرأة.
جــلــنــار
There are tow reasons for doing this. the first is that the logician and indeed the linguist, is not primarily concerned with practical questions such as " what does this word\sentence mean?, but with theoretical questions about what it is for a word or sentence to have a meaning. It is not directly relevant, therefore, what the world is actually like. More importantly, perhaps, we often talk about different 'world' in the sense that we envisage that things could be different from what they are. This is clear enough in conditional sentences and wishes such as If I had lived in Egypt I would have spoken Arabic and I wish I spoke Arabic. The world of belief, too, is different from the actual world. Possible worlds are also involved in epistemic and deontic modality, and indeed, logicians have used the term MODAL LOGIC to refer to analysis in terms of possible worlds, though clearly this is to use the term modal in a much wider sense.
There are some ambiguities and problems that can be dealt with in terms of extensions and intensions and of the notion of possible worlds ( the literature on the subject is very large, but is not altogether clear or consistent ) .
We may note, to begin with, the distinction made by Donnellan between the REFERNTIAL and the ATTRIBUTIVE use of referential expressions. He points out that Smith's murderer is insane is ambiguous, since it may mean either that a certain person, e.g. Jones, who is known to have murdered Smith, whoever he may be ( and it may not be known who he is ), is insane. In the first case ( the referential use ), the expression Smith's murderer is being used to identify someone and is thus concerned with extension in the real world; in the second case ( the attributive use ), we are more concerned with the description itself, with the intension of the expression and with its extension only in possible worlds.
Secondly, we may notice the ambiguity in the sentence Mary believes that the President is handsome. Although one mean e.g. Mr Smith, may, in fact, be President, Mary may believe that someone else, e.g. Mr Brown, is the President; the sentence may thus be taken to mean either that she believes that Mr Brown is handsome. This Kind of ambiguity is usually handled in terms of a de re and a de dicto interpretation ( about the thing' and 'about what is said –cf. Allwood et al. who offer the example John believes the man who robbed him was red-haired). In the one case we are concerned with the man who actually is President, and in the other with the man who is said, or believed to be President. What seem to be at issue here is the extension of the President – either Mr Smith in the real world, or Mr Brown in the world of Mary's belief.
Closely associated with this is what have been called OPAQUE contexts. Consider a situation in which Professor Green is the Dean. Then it will not necessarily follow that, if John believes that Professor Green is a genius is true, John believes that the Dean is a genius is also true, even though The Dean is tall will be true if Professor Green is tall is true. For obviously, if John dose not know that Professor Green is the Dean, he may believe that Professor Green is a genius, without necessarily believing that the Dean is a genius. An opaque context is defined as one in which truth is not preserved when certain types of co-referential expressions are substituted for one another. Thus, since Professor Green and the Dean are the same person, Professor Green and the Dean are co-referential expressions, but they cannot be substituted in the first pair of sentences with truth preservation. The same arguments can be applied to the examples the morning star and the evening star since Copernicus knew that the morning star was a planet and Copernicus knew that the evening star was a planet would not both be true or both false if Copernicus did not know that the morning star and the evening star were the same.
والله يجزاكم خير
27-07-2022 - 05:22 pm
السلام عليكم
حبيت تساعدوني عندي سميلر وراح اشرح هالكلام لبنات الدفعه وانا أول مره اشرح ولا اعرف وش النقاط الرئيسه ياليت تساعدونيThere are tow reasons for doing this. the first is that the logician and indeed the linguist, is not primarily concerned with practical questions such as " what does this word\sentence mean?, but with theoretical questions about what it is for a word or sentence to have a meaning. It is not directly relevant, therefore, what the world is actually like. More importantly, perhaps, we often talk about different 'world' in the sense that we envisage that things could be different from what they are. This is clear enough in conditional sentences and wishes such as If I had lived in Egypt I would have spoken Arabic and I wish I spoke Arabic. The world of belief, too, is different from the actual world. Possible worlds are also involved in epistemic and deontic modality, and indeed, logicians have used the term MODAL LOGIC to refer to analysis in terms of possible worlds, though clearly this is to use the term modal in a much wider sense.
There are some ambiguities and problems that can be dealt with in terms of extensions and intensions and of the notion of possible worlds ( the literature on the subject is very large, but is not altogether clear or consistent ) .
We may note, to begin with, the distinction made by Donnellan between the REFERNTIAL and the ATTRIBUTIVE use of referential expressions. He points out that Smith's murderer is insane is ambiguous, since it may mean either that a certain person, e.g. Jones, who is known to have murdered Smith, whoever he may be ( and it may not be known who he is ), is insane. In the first case ( the referential use ), the expression Smith's murderer is being used to identify someone and is thus concerned with extension in the real world; in the second case ( the attributive use ), we are more concerned with the description itself, with the intension of the expression and with its extension only in possible worlds.
Secondly, we may notice the ambiguity in the sentence Mary believes that the President is handsome. Although one mean e.g. Mr Smith, may, in fact, be President, Mary may believe that someone else, e.g. Mr Brown, is the President; the sentence may thus be taken to mean either that she believes that Mr Brown is handsome. This Kind of ambiguity is usually handled in terms of a de re and a de dicto interpretation ( about the thing' and 'about what is said –cf. Allwood et al. who offer the example John believes the man who robbed him was red-haired). In the one case we are concerned with the man who actually is President, and in the other with the man who is said, or believed to be President. What seem to be at issue here is the extension of the President – either Mr Smith in the real world, or Mr Brown in the world of Mary's belief.
Closely associated with this is what have been called OPAQUE contexts. Consider a situation in which Professor Green is the Dean. Then it will not necessarily follow that, if John believes that Professor Green is a genius is true, John believes that the Dean is a genius is also true, even though The Dean is tall will be true if Professor Green is tall is true. For obviously, if John dose not know that Professor Green is the Dean, he may believe that Professor Green is a genius, without necessarily believing that the Dean is a genius. An opaque context is defined as one in which truth is not preserved when certain types of co-referential expressions are substituted for one another. Thus, since Professor Green and the Dean are the same person, Professor Green and the Dean are co-referential expressions, but they cannot be substituted in the first pair of sentences with truth preservation. The same arguments can be applied to the examples the morning star and the evening star since Copernicus knew that the morning star was a planet and Copernicus knew that the evening star was a planet would not both be true or both false if Copernicus did not know that the morning star and the evening star were the same.
والله يجزاكم خير
should teachers correct evrey error students make why→